Veils, Crucifixes, and the Public  Sphere:  What Kind of Secularism? Rethinking Neutrality in a Post-Secular Europe by Jiménez Lobeira, Pablo Cristóbal
Veils, Crucifixes, and Public Sphere: What 
Kind of Secularism? Rethinking Neutrality in a 
Post-Secular Europe* 
Abstract: The Lautsi case attracted widespread attention in Europe and 
beyond. Though the issue in contention was a Christian symbol, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) judgements showed changes in assessment both 
about religion (in contrast with former cases regarding Muslim veils) and 
secularism (which did not have the same meaning for everyone). In light of those 
rulings, this paper reflects on the concepts of neutrality and secularism, and 
their normative implications for European citizens in terms of sense of 
belonging, solidarity, and cohesion. An open and plural public sphere, in which 
intercultural exchange can flourish, is crucial if Europe is serious about the 
integration of its immigrants, many of whom possess a Muslim background. A 
“post-secular” Europe may have to reconsider long-held stereotypes about 
religion, and nuance its self-understanding as “secular,” in a way that religious 
citizens can identify with Europe too. The discussion will draw on the ideas of 
Taylor, Casanova, Habermas, Weiler and Beck to illustrate some of the political, 
ethical and theoretical complexities of the Lautsi case in Italy, specifically issues 
to do with neutrality, secularism and the role of religion in the public sphere. 
Keywords: European citizens, intercultural dialogue, neutrality, public 
sphere, religion, secularism, secularity, solidarity, worldviews 
The down of the XXI century has seen the presence of religion in the public sphere 
grow globally. The “return of the gods” has been marked in the West by rather 
unpleasant memories, among which those of 9/11 result emblematic.1 The 
 
*A later version of this article appeared in the Journal of Intercultural Studies, Vol. 35, Issue 4, 
June 2014.  
1 The sense in which the “return of the gods” phrase is used here, looks to the fact that religion 
and the supernatural (“the gods”), contrary to what the classic (i.e. Modern, Max Weber style) 
secularisation theory predicted, did not disappear with progress. If anything, the gods “mutated” 
and today they re-appear not only in varied new forms, but even in the old traditional ways. The 
reason why the Christian crucifix and the Islamic veil (and minarets) have caused so much 
controversy and grasped so much attention in the public sphere is not that they are just symbols, 
but religious ones. That “secular Europe” would be discussing issues like these so passionately 
reveals such “return of the gods”. It does not necessarily mean that Europeans will or should 
“surrender” to them, or make a reverse of a thousand years and re-instate Islamic caliphates or 
Christian kingdoms. It just means that the issue of religion is there today as was before: to be 
accurate, the gods never left, but public memory has become (again) aware of their presence. 
Viewed from this perspective, the lively discussion about the permissibility of religious symbols 
in public schools is just a concrete chapter in the overall phenomenon of the returning gods. For 
deeper analyses on this idea, see, among many others: Davie G. (2006) Religion in Europe in the 
21 Century: The Factors to Take into Account. European Journal of Sociology 47: 271-296, 
Byrnes TA and Katzenstein PJ. (2006) Religion in an expanding Europe, Cambridge, UK ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, Casanova J. (2008) Public Religions Revisited. In: Vries Hd 
(ed) Religion: Beyond the Concept. Paperback ed. New York: Fordham University Press, 101-
119, Weber M and Parsons T. (2003) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: Dover 
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apocalyptic predictions of the Mayan calendar for 2012 are another sign that 
provokes thoughts, discussions, movies and trips to the pyramids in southern 
Mexico. Europe, even those parts of it where religion had greatly diminished its 
public presence, has not been an exception and is having its dose of religion as 
well, even if in a less picturesque way. 
Indeed, today Europe (and in particular the 27 member-state polity, the 
European Union or EU) is confronted—again—with the issue of religion in the 
public sphere.2 Yet apart from isolated incidents of violence,3 Europe is 
increasingly at odds with religion for a different reason. A large proportion of 
immigrants, residents, and citizens have a Muslim background. In other words, 
for many European citizens Islam is an important part of who they are, and how 
they find motivation, meaning and purpose for their lives.  
The “Muslim problem” (i.e. the difficulty that some Europeans have 
understanding and accepting residents and citizens of Islamic background or 
culture) at times motivates illiberal or undemocratic attitudes which betray long-
held prejudices about Muslims in particular and religion in general. Such 
attitudes challenge presuppositions and promises of liberal democracies in two 
ways.4 First, by feeding anxiety about how much public tolerance can there be to 
the inclusion of citizens notwithstanding their religiosity. Secondly, by stiring fear 
that the presence of religion in the public sphere will threaten the foundations of 
the modern constitutional state—grounded upon neutrality and secularity for 
very specific reasons.  
In the next lines this paper takes from a case before the ECHR on religious 
symbols to illustrate a few complexities of the “problem of religion” in Europe, to 
evaluate some assumptions about religion and neutrality in the public sphere, 
and to draw some normative implications for harmonious coexistence, solidarity 
and political identity of Europe in the post-secular age.5 
 
Publications, (2005) Secular Europe and Religious America: Implications for Transatlantic 
Relations. (accessed 11 Nov 2010), Habermas J. (2010) An Awareness of What is Missing – 
Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age, Cambridge: Polity Press, Habermas J. (2006) Religion 
in the Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy 14: 1-25, Habermas J. (2008a) Notes on 
a Post-secular Society. signandsight.com - let's talk European. Beck U and Livingstone R. 
(2010) A God of One's Own: Religion's Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
2 Croatia is set to officially become the 28th member state in July 2013.  
3 Theo van Gogh’s assassination by a Muslim extremist on the 2d of November 2004 is an 
example. Though extremism does not seem an exclusive of Islam, as Anders Breivik’s shotting of 
nearly 100 young members of the Labour Party on the 22d of July 2011 at the Utøya Island 
demonstrated. 
4 For a discussion on the link between liberal democracy and culture, see: Jiménez Lobeira PC. 
(2011a) Liberal Democracy: Culture-free? Habermas, Ratzinger & Europe. Australian & New 
Zealand Journal of European Studies  
Vol.2(2)/3(1): 44-57. 
5 I am indebted to members of the Project on European Identity at the Centre of Excellence 
Foundations of European Law and Polity (University of Helsinki), and participants at the 
seminar “Lautsi v Italy, Whose Law? Which Religion?” held at the University of Helsinki on 
September 2011, to Dr John Besemeres, and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
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Veils, Crucifixes and Public Education 
On the 18th of March 2011, the ECHR (“the Court”) gave its final word over a 
controversy that had lasted nearly a decade. The Lautsi and others v Italy (or 
"Lautsi") case had attracted increasing attention first in Italy and eventually in 
Europe and beyond. The issue in contention was if crucifixes should be taken 
down from classroom walls in Italian public schools.6 
The applicant, Ms Soile Lautsi, a Fin married to an Italian (Mr Massimo 
Albertin), found it unacceptable that her two children (Dataico and Sami) should 
see every day a crucifix hanging from the classroom walls in the public school they 
attended.7 She argued that the presence of crucifixes on the walls infringed her 
parental right to educate her children according to her philosophical convictions; 
her right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; and her right to 
manifest her own beliefs (alluding to Article 2, Protocol 1, and Article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, or “the Convention”).8 Together with 
her husband, Ms Lautsi belongs to the Italian Union of Atheists,9 Agnostics and 
Rationalists (organisation member of the European Humanist Federation, and of 
the International Humanist Ethical Union).10 
 
6 Cf ECHR GCot. (2011) Case of Lautsi and Others v Italy. In: Rights ECoH (ed) Application no. 
30814/06. Strasbourg: ECHR, 51. 
7 In this article, arguments from both the applicant and the defendant are, for reasons of space, 
greatly synthesised. Many details are omitted in a case which started in 2002 and went through 
several levels of justice administration in Italy (Veneto Administrative Court, Italy’s 
Constitutional Court, Italian Supreme Administrative Court) before it got to the ECHR. And at 
the ECHR there are many nuances that arise from comparing the first and second cases. For the 
complete information refer to the case itself (footnote number 2). Here reference is made only to 
specific aspects that are essential for the analysis of neutrality in the European public sphere.  
8 ECHR GCot. (2011) Case of Lautsi and Others v Italy. In: Rights ECoH (ed) Application no. 
30814/06. Strasbourg: ECHR, 51. This international treaty is called: “Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom,” though it is commonly refer to (even 
by the Council of Europe) with the abbreviated name. (2010a) European Convention on Human 
Rights. European Court of Human Rights. (accessed 4 Feb 2012). 
9 For very comprehensive treatments of the phenomenon of secularism, which includes the re-
emergence of both religions and atheism, see, among many other studies: Taylor C. (2007) A 
secular age: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Taylor C. (2009) The Polysemy of the 
Secular. Social Research 76: 1143-1166, De de Botton A. (2012) Religion for Atheists: A non-
believer's guide to the uses of religion: Penguin Books Limited, Byrnes TA and Katzenstein PJ. 
(2006) Religion in an expanding Europe, Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, Casanova J. (2004) Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration. 
Eurozine. (accessed 17 Aug 2010), Casanova J. (2009) The Secular and Secularisms. Social 
Research 76: 1049-1066, Scott D and Hirschkind C. (2006) Powers of the secular modern : 
Talal Asad and his interlocutors, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, Davie G. (2006) 
Religion in Europe in the 21 Century: The Factors to Take into Account. European Journal of 
Sociology 47: 271-296, Dawkins R. (2006) The God Delusion: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
Hahn S and Wiker B. (2008) Answering the New Atheism: Dismantling Dawkins' Case Against 
God: Emmaus Road Pub. 
10 ECHR GCot. (2011) Case of Lautsi and Others v Italy. In: Rights ECoH (ed) Application no. 
30814/06. Strasbourg: ECHR, 51. Their websites are, respectively: http://www.uaar.it/, 
http://humanistfederation.eu/, and http://www.iheu.org/,  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1648711
4  Public Education, Veils, and Crucifixes: What Kind of Secularism? 
The defendant, the Government of Italy, argued that the crucifix was a passive 
symbol; part of the Italian national identity; a summary of Italian and Western 
values such as non-violence, equal dignity of all human beings, justice and 
sharing, forgiveness to one’s enemies, separation of politics and religion, and 
freedom of choice. The Government argued as well that there was no consensus 
on how to interpret the principle of secularism among the member countries of 
the Council of Europe; that the majority in Italy wanted crucifixes in the 
classrooms; and that “neutrality”—an “inclusive” concept—was being confused 
with “secularism”—an “exclusive” concept.11  
The ECHR’s first ruling (2009) went in favour of Ms Lautsi.12 In keeping the 
crucifixes on public school classroom walls, the State was, even if perhaps 
indirectly, imposing religious beliefs on young minds. Negative freedom of 
religion—for instance atheism—asserted the Court’s judgement, deserved 
especial protection. The display of religious symbols could not be justified even 
by the desire of the majority of parents (as was the case in the public school Ms 
Lauti’s children attended) to have them there. The State should take religion out 
of this public space, in order to educate the children in “pluralism” and “critical 
thinking”, and to preserve a “democratic society”.13  
In past cases related to religious symbols the Court had ruled in favour of 
banning women who wore Islamic headscarves from attending university (Sahin 
v Turkey),14 teaching in public school classrooms (Dahlab v Switzerland),15 or even 
entering their schools (Dogru; and Kevanci; v France).16 Therefore, the 2009 
decision of the Court on Lautsi was consistent with the application of the 
“principle of secularism” (separation of religion and politics) understood in a 
particular way: religion should be out of the public sphere, and remain private. 
But was that what the principle ought to mean in terms of neutrality?  
A group of 20 states (mostly from Central and Eastern Europe) sided with Italy 
in her appeal to the ECHR’s Grand Chamber (its ultimate instance) to review the 
ruling.17 Eight of those countries participated collectively in the oral procedure as 
third party intervening states, asking Joseph HH Weiler, Professor of Law at New 
York University, to present arguments on their behalf.18 He accepted. During a 15 
minute intervention before the 17 Judges forming the Grand Chamber, Weiler—
 
11 Ibid. 
12 ECHR SS. (2009) Case of Lautsi v Italy. Ibid., 15. 
13 Ibid. 
14 ECHR GCot. (2005) Case of Leyla Şahin v Turkey. In: Rights ECoH (ed). 165 numbers. 
15 ECHR. (2001) Dahlab v Switzerland. In: Rights ECoH (ed). Strasbourg. 
16 ECHR FS. (2008b) Case of Dogru v France. In: ECHR (ed). ECHR FS. (2008a) Affaire 
Kervanci c. France. In: ECHR (ed). 
17 Albania, Armenia, Austria, Bulgaria, Croacia, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, (FYR of) 
Macedonia, Malta, Moldavia, Monaco, Polonia, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia 
and Ukraine. Cf ECHR GCot. (2011) Case of Lautsi and Others v Italy. In: Rights ECoH (ed) 
Application no. 30814/06. Strasbourg: ECHR, 51. 
18 Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Russia, and San Marino. See: Weiler 
JHH. (2010b) Oral Submission by Professor Joseph Weiler before the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights. ilsussidiario.net. Online ed. 
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a practicing Jew, wearing a yarmulke—dug deep into the meaning of neutrality 
and secularism for democracies in Europe.  
Weiler pointed out that many public symbols have a religious origin. In 
Europe, the Cross was the most visible example, appearing on flags, crests, 
buildings, and other places. The Cross was neither a purely national nor a solely 
religious symbol. It was both. One logical consequence of the 2009 ECHR ruling 
would be that photos of the Queen should be removed from public spaces in the 
UK, because she is both Head of the State and of the Church of England. Using a 
similar rationale (mentioned by Weiler in an editorial), British children should 
be preserved from listening (even less, learning) the national Anthem (God Save 
the Queen).19 For Weiler, mandating a “naked wall”, especially when a religious 
symbol had been there for centuries, was not “neutral”, but rather an 
endorsement of a worldview—secularism—over religion.20 Indeed, it was “legally 
disingenuous to adopt a political position which splits our society, and to claim 
that somehow it is neutral.”21 
Under Weiler’s perspective plurality implies a public sphere in which different 
worldviews (e.g. secularist, Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and others) coexist 
respecting each other. Banning the presence of one or several of them from the 
public sphere was questionable in principle, and divisive in practice. In fact, “the 
position adopted by the [Second] Chamber [in 2009]” was “not an expression of 
the pluralism manifest by the Convention system, but an expression of the values 
of the laïque [ie secularist] State.”22 For Weiler, a pluralist education might 
require the school precinct to reflect the pluralism in society—some rooms with 
naked walls, some with crucifixes, some with Stars of David, some with Stars and 
Crescents.23 This task, though, was for every country—not for the ECHR—to 
decide (e.g. France has a model of “laicism”; Denmark and Finland have state 
religions).24  
The Court’s final word came in March 2011. By an overwhelming majority the 
Grand Chamber reversed the Second Chamber’s ruling.25 The decision whether 
 
19 Cf Weiler JH. (2010a) Lautsi: Crucifix in the Classroom Redux. European Journal of 
International Law 21. 
20 (2010b) Joseph Weiler argues high-profile classroom crucifix case before European Court of 
Human Rights. NYU School of Law News. (accessed 4 Feb 2012). 
21 Weiler JHH. (2010b) Oral Submission by Professor Joseph Weiler before the Grand Chamber 
of the European Court of Human Rights. ilsussidiario.net. Online ed. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Weiler JH. (2010a) Lautsi: Crucifix in the Classroom Redux. European Journal of 
International Law 21. 
24 Weiler JHH. (2010b) Oral Submission by Professor Joseph Weiler before the Grand Chamber 
of the European Court of Human Rights. ilsussidiario.net. Online ed. 
25 The Court’s Grand Chamber held, by 15 votes to 2, that there had been no violation of Article 2 
of Protocol 1 (“…the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and 
teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions”), and that no 
separate issues arose under Article 9 of the Convention (freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion); and it held unanimously that there was no cause to examine the complaint under 
Article 14 of the Convention (prohibition of discrimination on any ground). Cf (2010a) 
European Convention on Human Rights. European Court of Human Rights. (accessed 4 Feb 
2012).  
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crucifixes should be present in State-school classrooms fell under the margin of 
appreciation of the Italian State.26 The fact that there was no European consensus 
regarding the presence of religious symbols in State schools spoke in favour of 
that approach. The crucifix, though clearly a religious symbol, was also a passive 
one, and did not, in the case of Italian public schools, imply obligation for any 
student to receive religious instruction or participate in related rites or activities.27  
Ms Lautsi, the Court commented, had possessed the right to inculcate in her 
children her own worldview without interference. Children were allowed to 
attend the school wearing symbols associated with their worldviews, such as 
Islamic headscarves.28 The Court found “nothing to suggest that the authorities 
were intolerant of pupils who believed in other religions, were non-believers or 
held non-religious philosophical convictions.”29  
The Court’s Grand Chamber considered that the State should ensure, 
impartially, the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs, in order to 
promote public order and tolerance.30 Their role was to “help maintain public 
order,...harmony, and tolerance in a democratic society,” concerning “both 
relations between believers and non-believers and relations between the 
adherents of various religions, faiths and beliefs”.31 The Convention did not 
“prevent States from imparting, through teaching or education, information or 
knowledge of a directly or indirectly religious or philosophical kind.” The 
Convention did require States to take care that “information or knowledge 
included in the curriculum” was conveyed “in an objective, critical and pluralistic 
manner,” and “in a calm atmosphere free of any proselytism.”32 
A final important point of the Grand Chamber’s ruling was its 
acknowledgement that “supporters of secularism” were able “to lay claim to 
views” with “the ‘level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’ required 
for them to be considered ‘convictions’”.33 Secularism must be regarded as a 
philosophical conviction worthy of respect in a democratic society.34  
The Lautsi case is emblematic of a wider discussion. In both rulings, the 
Court’s judges cited former cases where the point in contention had been the 
possible presence (or not) of religious symbols or contents, in the public sphere. 
The underlying normative assumption is that the public sphere should not be 
 
26 ECHR GCot. (2011) Case of Lautsi and Others v Italy. In: Rights ECoH (ed) Application no. 
30814/06. Strasbourg: ECHR, 51. 
27 Thus it did not denote indoctrination. Ibid. See a precedent regarding religious education in 
Norway: ECHR GC. (2007) Case of Folgerø and Others v Norway. In: Rights ECoH (ed). 
Strasbourg. 
28 ECHR GCot. (2011) Case of Lautsi and Others v Italy. In: Rights ECoH (ed) Application no. 
30814/06. Strasbourg: ECHR, 51. 
29 Ibid. 
30 “Critical thinking” was not mentioned as incompatible with any worldview, religious or not. 
Compare with the Second Section’s judgement: ECHR SS. (2009) Case of Lautsi v Italy. Ibid., 
15. 
31 ECHR GCot. (2011) Case of Lautsi and Others v Italy. Ibid.: ECHR, 51. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Within the meaning of Article 9 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol 1: ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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religious; or in positive terms, that it should be “secular”. A secular public sphere 
guarantees equality for all citizens, sustained by a neutral state.  
However, the concepts of “neutrality” and “secularism” were invoked by the 
two contending parties, and used by the Court following a different interpretation 
in each of the two rulings). The terms have appeared in the abundant literature 
around the case before and after the final decision, used by those who agree with 
it and those who do not. The main misunderstanding seems to lie in what the 
concepts mean, and in particular the specific way in which secularism and 
neutrality are related. This question is analysed next. 
Secularity and Secularism 
During the ECHR cases dealing with the public presence of religion, neutrality is 
always seen as a good, as a desirable characteristic of those exercising power and 
authority, and of the medium—the public sphere—in which formal and informal 
deliberation of citizens takes place.  
In order to understand both the concept and the importance of neutrality in 
the modern state today, a very synthetic contextualisation could be in place. 
Habermas explains how a religious mentality founded on the literal 
interpretation of sacred scriptures encountered some times among Christian, 
Islamic, Jewish or Hindu groups, “clashes with fundamental convictions of 
modernity”.35 The neutrality of the state implies an even-handed treatment of 
different worldviews within the polity in order to ensure “equal freedom of 
religion for all”.36 Conflicts between worldviews “dominated large parts of modern 
European history”, and  
…today they are being repeated not only in relations between the 
western and Islamic worlds but also in those between militant groups 
of religious and secularized citizens within liberal societies. We can 
view these conflicts either as power struggles between state authority 
and religious movements or as conflicts between secular and religious 
convictions.37 
Analytically, neutrality translates into a public political atmosphere that allows 
citizens and groups of citizens holding different worldviews, to live in harmony, 
and agree in fundamental public questions, with the rest of the political 
community. Normatively, neutrality denotes the safeguard of the modern values 
of “equality,” “freedom,” and at least a pre-condition for solidarity or 
“fraternity”—if we may borrow these terms from what Taylor calls the “French 
Revolutionary trinity”.38 Furthermore, the very legitimacy of constitutional 
democracies lies in the support of reasons “which can be accepted in a pluralist 
 
35 Habermas J. (2010) An Awareness of What is Missing – Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular 
Age, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Taylor C. (2009) The Polysemy of the Secular. Social Research 76: 1143-1166. 
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society by religious citizens, by citizens of different religions, and by secular 
citizens alike”.39  
Now Habermas’s account shows an evolution in the concept of neutrality. 
Originally, neutrality (whose most evident manifestation came to be the secular 
state) would have arisen as a practical solution to conflicts between groups 
professing different religious views. In the case of, for instance, XVII century 
Europe that translated into wars and mutual persecutions between Christian 
denominations or “confessions”.40 To this situation Locke’s thoughts on 
toleration attempted to propose a solution.41 A version of this concept of 
“confessional neutrality” is used by the Court in the first (2009) ruling. Religion 
is viewed as troublesome and a source of conflict. It does not have a place in the 
public sphere. The state “has a duty to uphold confessional neutrality in public 
education…which must seek to inculcate in pupils the habit of critical thought”.42  
Yet Habermas does not confine his reflections to religious citizens only, but to 
those who hold non-religious worldviews as well, since everybody with a 
worldview, not only religious people, has the potential to become confronting and 
intolerant of the views of others.43 He sees us as living in a “post-secular” age, one 
in which religion and secularism continue to exist, and must engage in dialogue 
not only about, but also with each other.44 The thought of neutrality therefore is 
closely connected to that of secularism. It is the latter that requires a more careful 
exploration in order to bring light on the former and on the whole discussion of 
this paper.  
As Taylor has shown, “secular” is a polysemic term.45 Historically it developed 
in Latin Christendom (from its previous use with the Romans). Secular (from 
saeculum) means “the century”, a profane (“earthly”) time as opposed to a higher 
(eternal) time. Hence “secular” could mean “temporal” in contrast with “eternal” 
or “spiritual”. In a different nuance, secular clergy was that operating “in the 
century” as opposed to that under monastic rules (or “regular” clergy). As a 
gradual process (which cannot be explained here due to lack of space) of 
“secularisation” took place in the former Western (or “Latin”) Christendom, while 
at the same time many people went on believing in the transcendent, “secular” 
 
39 Habermas J. (2010) An Awareness of What is Missing – Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular 
Age, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
40 Judaism was the official religion of no king or state and therefore Jewish people in Europe 
were, at the best tolerated, awfully often persecuted, and shamefully for Europe and for 
humanity exterminated towards the middle of the XX century—and not only in Germany.  
4141 Locke advocates toleration towards all denominations and religions (with the only exception 
of Atheists and Catholics), and separation of political affairs from doctrine and faith. Locke J. 
(2010) A Letter concerning Toleration and Other Writings In: Goldie M (ed). Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund. 
42 ECHR SS. (2009) Case of Lautsi v Italy. In: Rights ECoH (ed) Application no. 30814/06. 
Strasbourg, 15. I leave for the moment the reference to “critical thought”, but the implication 
about religious citizens is obvious. 
43 See above.  
44 Habermas J. (2010) An Awareness of What is Missing – Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular 
Age, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
45 Taylor C. (2009) The Polysemy of the Secular. Social Research 76: 1143-1166. 
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came to mean the opposite concern, with “things of this world” or immanence.46 
The history of the term in the West is “complex and ambiguous,” with “secular” 
starting as part of a dyad to distinguish two dimensions of existence (temporal or 
immanent, spiritual or transcendent). However, around the XVIII century  
…it mutates into a term in another dyad, where ”secular” refers to what 
pertains to a self-sufficient immanent sphere, and its contrasting term 
(often identified as “religious”) relates to the transcendent realm. This 
can then undergo a further mutation…into a dyad in which one term 
refers to the real (the secular), and the other to what is merely invented 
(the religious); or where “secular” refers to the institutions we really 
require to live in “this world,” and “religious”…to optional extras that 
often disturb the course of this-worldly life.47 
Today, “it is generally agreed that modern democracies have to be ‘secular’”, 
continues Taylor. But even in the Western context “the term is not limpid”. It 
involves “some kind of separation of church and state”, yet “secularism requires 
more than this.”48 Before we follow Taylor in his explanation (continued below) 
of the public good towards which secularism should be intended, an analytical 
distinction could be beneficial. Several authors, including Taylor, Casanova to a 
lesser extent, and others, tend to use “secular”, “secularity” and “secularism” 
almost interchangeably.49 After all that is the way it is used in common language, 
and in law cases related above. However, “secularism” should be specified if its 
relation with neutrality is to become clearer.  
According to Casanova, secularism may mean either a statecraft postulate, or 
an ideology. In its first denotation secularism entails “some principle of 
separation between religious and political authority, either for the sake of 
neutrality of the state vis-à-vis each and all religions, or for the sake of protecting 
the freedom of conscience of each individual, or for the sake of facilitating the 
equal access of all citizens”, religious or not, “to democratic participation.”50 Every 
form of statecraft secularism entails two principles: 1) separation (of church and 
state) or “no establishment” of any religion, and 2) free exercise of conscience (to 
believe or not to believe). The first principle, pluralism of worldviews, should 
serve the second, freedom and equality for all citizens. The latter is a necessary 
condition for democracy, an end in itself. But it is possible to have the former 
without democracy, especially when “secularism” ceases to be a formal device of 
statecraft and acquires substantive form.51  
If that happens, says Casanova, secularism turns “ideological,” i.e. it becomes 
a normative standing, especially when it “arrogates for itself the mantle of 
 
46 Cf ibid. 
47Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 For instance Cécile Laborde in her very interesting (even for those of us who do not share her 
point of view) defence of the banning of the scarves in France: Laborde C. (2005) Secular 
Philosophy and Muslim Headscarves in Schools*. Journal of Political Philosophy 13: 305-329. 
50 Casanova J. (2009) The Secular and Secularisms. Social Research 76: 1049-1066. 
51 “Soviet-type regimes, Kemalist Turkey, or post-Revolutionary Mexico being obvious 
examples.”Ibid. 
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rationality and universality, while claiming that ‘religion’ is essentially 
nonrational, particularistic, and intolerant (or illiberal)” and therefore “a threat 
to democratic politics once it enters the public sphere.” These ideas “can hardly 
be grounded empirically in the collective historical experience of European 
societies in the twentieth century or in the actual experience of most 
contemporary Europeans”, yet they constitute a construct  
…that has the function of positively differentiating modern secular 
Europeans from “the religious other,” either from premodern religious 
Europeans or from contemporary non-European religious people, 
particularly from Muslims.52 
Perhaps what Casanova denominates “secularism as statecraft” could be 
alternatively designated as “secularity;” and what for him is “secularism as 
ideology” could be simply called “secularism”. “Secularity” denotes a feature that 
characterises a certain atmosphere, or a political arrangement, or a style of 
government. “Secularism,” like many other “-isms” implies a movement or 
promotion of ideology, doctrines or belief systems.53 
Indeed, many aspects of “the secular” are highly desirable today not only for 
“secularists” but also for agnostics and most believers in Western societies. 
Habermas has made a similar distinction after describing a “Kulturkampf” 
between “radical multiculturalists” and “militant secularists” in the context of 
post-secular societies. According to him, a “secular or unbelieving person…relates 
agnostically to religious validity claims” under an “indifferent stance”. In 
contrast, 
…secularists tend to adopt a polemical stance towards religious 
doctrines that maintain a public influence despite the fact that their 
claims cannot be scientifically justified. Today, secularism is often 
based on “hard” naturalism, i.e., one based on scientistic 
assumptions.54 
With this distinction in mind let us now return to Taylor’s discussion (started 
above) about the public good (or the purpose) of what we are calling secularity 
(started above). For him secularity “involves…a complex requirement”—which 
are in reality normative goals. The first requirement is “liberty,” so that “…no-one 
must be forced in the domain of religion, or basic belief…including…the freedom 
not to believe…” The second, “equality… between people” of different worldviews, 
in a way that “no…religious or areligious…Weltanschauung can enjoy privileged 
status, let alone be adopted as the official view of the state.” And third, 
“fraternity,” meaning that “all spiritual families must be…included in the ongoing 
process of determining what the society is about (its political identity), and how 
it is going to realize these goals (the exact regime of rights and privileges),” 
 
52 Ibid. 
53 Think of Marxism, Confucianism, or Republicanism, for instance.  
54 Habermas J. (2008a) Notes on a Post-secular Society. signandsight.com - let's talk European. 
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maintaining, as much as possible “relations of harmony and comity between the 
supporters of different…Weltanschauungen”.55  
Whether the normative goals of secularity find their best depiction in Taylor’s 
account is open to debate. But note how his discussion focuses on what we are 
calling secularity; whereas what we have called secularism can be identified 
within each one of the goals as a worldview alongside others (religions included). 
This is a distinction that the Grand Chamber of the ECHR, unlike the Second 
Chamber, acknowledges right from the beginning of its final decision (as related 
above). Let us now consider how these distinctions might play out in the 
European public sphere. For that we will use a description of the cultural 
atmosphere in which Western societies live today.  
As we have seen before, unlike a situation similar to, say, that of the 1500s, 
when it was “virtually impossible not to believe in God” today we live in “a secular 
age,” one in which “faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human 
possibility among others.”56 The “buffered identity of the disciplined individual, 
moves in a constructed social space, where instrumental rationality is a key value, 
and time is pervasively secular.” Taylor calls this atmosphere the “immanent 
frame,” which constitutes a “natural” order, as opposed to a “supernatural” one, 
“an ‘immanent’ world, over and against a possible ‘transcendent’ one.”57 This 
immanent frame in which we live can “slough off the transcendent. But it doesn’t 
necessarily do so…” Some people living in it as open to something beyond, some 
do not. “It is something which permits closure, without demanding it.”58 
Now what with Habermas we have called “secularity” here corresponds to 
Casanova’s “statecraft secularism” and to Taylor’s “immanent frame”. It is the de 
facto cultural atmosphere in which we live. And that is not problematic as long as 
such atmosphere remains “open”—receptive of, or at least tolerant towards—
cultural positions which look beyond, to the possibility of transcendence. An open 
immanent frame means that the cultural medium of secularity is substantively, 
normatively “neutral”—neither privileging a cultural position or worldview above 
others, nor excluding any of them.  
Hence an open immanent frame bears an inclusive public sphere. Yet, when 
the immanent frame turns from secular to secularist it becomes “closed”: one 
among the many worldviews held by citizens in the public sphere becomes the 
exclusive (or at least a strongly privileged) view. Citizens who do not share that 
worldview must adapt their outlooks in order to fit with the official 
Weltanschauung, or else risk being left out—or at the margins—of public 
participation. A closed immanent frame is neither neutral nor inclusive.  
 
55 Taylor C. (2009) The Polysemy of the Secular. Social Research 76: 1143-1166. 
56 Taylor C. (2007) A secular age: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Due to lack of 
space I will not expound on the why and how our age is secular. Taylor’s work is deeply 
insightful and comprehensive in that respect. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. For further explanation on how the immanent frame can be open or closed, see pp. 
546ss. 
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Neutrality in Post-secular Societies 
A “post-secular” society is one that has been “secular” first. Habermas cites as 
examples affluent countries in Europe, as well as Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. These regions “have witnessed a spreading awareness that their citizens 
are living in a secularized society”.59 These would be typical examples of societies 
living in Taylor’s “secular age”. So what is “post-secular” about them? Only the 
fact that the relevance of religion has not, as it had been hypothesised in the past, 
waned (the necessary link between secularisation and modernisation is now 
increasingly challenged).60  
Among the phenomena that create “the impression of a worldwide ‘resurgence 
of religion’” Habermas mentions: “the missionary expansion” (of Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in different regions of the world), “a 
fundamentalist radicalisation” (of certain groups within Christianity and Islam 
mainly) and “the political instrumentalisation of the potential for violence innate 
in many of the world religions” (of Hindu nationalism, partially Pakistani Islam, 
the mullah regime in Iran, and “the mobilisation of the religious right in the 
United States” around the invasion of Iraq in 2003).61  
Today “public consciousness in Europe can be described as ‘post-secular’” due 
to a “change in consciousness” where “the certainty that cultural and social 
modernisation can advance only at the cost of public influence and personal 
relevance of religion” has been shaken. Religion is not only “gaining influence 
worldwide” but also within national public spheres. More concretely, “the 
Muslims next door…give the secular citizens a keener consciousness of the 
phenomenon of the public presence of religion.” Indeed the “issue of tolerant 
coexistence…is made harder by the difficult problem of how to integrate 
immigrant cultures socially.”62 
The preceding descriptive account gives place to normative questions, such as 
…whether a secularist devaluation of religion, if it were one day to be 
shared by the vast majority of secular citizens, is at all compatible with 
the post-secular balance between shared citizenship and cultural 
difference…63 
And in my view this is the key point that defines how neutrality in the public 
sphere should be understood. Though the right mix for a balanced, harmonised 
society is certainly a big challenge, the concept of neutrality cannot disregard 
equality between citizens of the same polity, on the one hand, or recognition of 
their cultural differences on the other, inasmuch as culture and religion are often 
important components of citizens’ identities. Equality, after all, implies mutual 
respect: 
 
59 Habermas J. (2008b) Notes on Post-Secular Society. New Perspectives Quarterly 25: 17-29. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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Do the selfsame normative expectations that rule an inclusive civil 
society not prohibit a secularist devaluation of religion just as they 
prohibit, for example, the religious rejection of equal rights for men 
and women? 64  
However, respect is only the beginning. The basis for inclusion, sense of 
belonging, and eventually solidarity to be created in the political community 
requires also “a complementary learning process” as necessary on the part of 
religious as on that of the “secular side unless we confuse the neutrality of a 
secular state…with the purging of the political public sphere of all religious 
contributions.”65 
Individual Cosmopolitanism, Religion and Peaceful 
Co-existence 
It would seem that largely the consensus in today’s liberal democracies is for 
secularity, as has been defined above: an arrangement that permits plurality of 
Weltanschauungen—both secularist and religious. That has been to position 
suggested by this paper so far: a public frame that is secular and open to (tolerant 
of) the possibility of transcendence. In order to clarify a little more such ideas, it 
could be helpful to contrast them with a recent proposal on this field.  
Ulrich Beck’s call to all religions to become a force for good in today global 
arena is interesting and insightful. He definitely realises that religion in the XXI 
century is very far from disappearing and is a reality that must be taken into 
account in his native Germany, in “secular Europe” and elsewhere. His 
“individual cosmopolitanism” seeks to solve the difficulty between competing 
(absolute) truths and the possibility of peace, and calls for a pragmatic 
arrangement from religions to cooperate towards global justice (alleviation of 
poverty, mitigation of climate change, attention to immigrants and refugees, and 
so forth) and avoid the danger the world faces today of self-annihilation. Hardly 
anyone could disagree with the goals he proposes.  
His analysis, however, reveals a few assumptions which would be difficult to 
endorse, at least in the way in which they are expressed in his book. Beck’s 
proposal would not be, in other words, the kind of secularity best for problems 
such as the one illustrated in Lautsi.  
The first questionable assumption regards his conception of religion vis-à-vis 
reason: often it would seem that for him they are mutually exclusive;66 implicitly, 
the prerogative of rationality stays for him with secular thinking. Yet the secular 
can turn secularist (fundamentalist) and therefore irrational. He does not seem 
to contemplate this possibility, and relates the world wars of the XX century to 
 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66For instance: “The threat that is ultimately conjured up by the death of a secular hope is the 
rebirth of religious warriors and religious wars…” Beck U and Livingstone R. (2010) A God of 
One's Own: Religion's Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence: John Wiley & Sons. He 
also associates religion (only) and danger or even violence (ibid.). 
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“the linkage of nation, religion and violence,”67 overlooking that those conflicts, 
while certainly containing evident doses of violence and nationalism, did not have 
a religious cause (and were perpetrated, as Casanova points out, by secular 
totalitarian regimes which rather persecuted religion).68  
As has been submitted above, fanaticism is not a monopoly of religion, but a 
tendency in which any human individual or group can fall if not careful, usually 
motivated by things that are good but become absolutes. Then anyone outside the 
correct doctrine or worldview becomes a pariah who must be persecuted or 
eliminated. There are great rational, thinking human beings with the apparently 
more contrasting worldviews, and they can still tolerate and argue with each 
other. The exchange of ideas between secular thinker Jürgen Habermas and 
religious thinker, Joseph Ratzinger in 2005 is but one example.69 There are as 
well abundant examples of people—religious or not—with intolerant attitudes, 
irrational views, and violent behaviours. 
Whether, for instance, there is a “God” or not, be it in the strong sense given 
by the monotheistic religions; or in the sense given to the term in polytheistic or 
pantheistic religions; or even in the much weaker, quasi-postmodern, 
immanentist and therefore secular conception that Beck himself seems to have 
about the “God” (or god?) “of one’s own;”70 or whether simply there is no God, as 
Dawkins would sustain;71 is certainly a matter for contention. But the fact that the 
matter can be discussed in a rational, “civilised” way bespeaks of a human 
rationality which people on both sides of the discussion are capable. 
The second problematic assumption has to do with Beck’s conceptions of 
“truth” in connection with “peace”. If each person has a different opinion about, 
say, God (or any other issue, for that matter), can the discussion be solved by 
affirming that “everybody is right,” or everybody has their truth and a “God” of 
their own? Is that not another way of saying, either that in the end nobody has 
the (real, objective) truth about the issue? This is not a pattern of thought we 
apply to topics that are important to our age. We would not use it to speak, for 
instance, about climate change, evolution or human rights. People may take 
different positions and disagree even strongly with others about them, but the 
issue is not solved by saying that “everybody is right”.72  
 
67 Beck U and Grande E. (2010) Varieties of second modernity: the cosmopolitan turn in social 
and political theory and research. The British Journal of Sociology 61: 409-443. 
68 Casanova J. (2009) The Secular and Secularisms. Social Research 76: 1049-1066. 
69 See an analysis on their dialogue in: Jiménez Lobeira PC. (2011b) Liberal Democracy: Culture 
Free? The Habermas-Ratzinger Debate and its Implications for Europe. Australian & New 
Zealand Journal of European Studies Volume 2, No 2 / Volume 3, No 1.: 44-57. 
70 Beck U and Livingstone R. (2010) A God of One's Own: Religion's Capacity for Peace and 
Potential for Violence: John Wiley & Sons. 
71 See: Dawkins R. (2006) The God Delusion: Houghton Mifflin Company. And the interesting 
and opposed view in: Hahn S and Wiker B. (2008) Answering the New Atheism: Dismantling 
Dawkins' Case Against God: Emmaus Road Pub. 
72 In fact, Beck himself holds, as every person does, certain principles to be true. For instance, he 
rightly defends the truth about human rights. See: Beck U and Livingstone R. (2010) A God of 
One's Own: Religion's Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence: John Wiley & Sons. 
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And this point is important not only in inter-religious dialogue, but also more 
broadly in dialogue between contending comprehensive worldviews, or systems 
of belief, whether religious or secular.73 Dismissing the discussion about the 
“God” issue by saying that everybody/nobody is right (or has the truth) about it, 
is not necessarily a path towards peace.74 Intuitively, and following a line that 
Taylor, Ratzinger and Habermas have undertaken each in their own way,75 an 
interlocutor with a different system of belief to mine would probably more—and 
not less—disposed towards peace if she knows that I consider seriously what she 
says as possibly true; if she thus feels recognised; and if she perceives that rather 
than concealing my own views, I can honestly give reasons for what I believe, even 
if that may be in contrast or opposition with her view.  
 Opening up to the possibility that an issue of vital importance (and heated 
controversy) for large groups of people may actually have a true answer; or that 
some answers may be closer to the truth about it than others; does not detract, 
however, from what seems to be Beck’s main purpose in his proposal. Peace could 
be worked out through the pragmatic acceptance between people of different 
worldviews, that even if they do not agree on a subject, and even if there is a 
chance that some of them may be more or less right about it, they still should 
agree on carrying on the discussion in civilised and rational ways. 
Fundamentalists should not be able to impose their views on others by force.76 
But of course this should hold for fundamentalists or any kind—religious or 
secular.  
The third dubious assumption in Beck’s analysis regards the place his own, 
normative position has in relation to worldviews, religious or secular. It would 
seem by his account that his individual cosmopolitanism is above worldviews, 
therefore out of danger of being substantive (and therefore partial). Thus his 
position would be able to mediate and comprehend the religious worldviews and 
establish harmony and peace between them.77 But is not his position a variation 
of a secular system of belief, therefore a creed as well that is to be placed not above 
 
73 E.g. the New Atheism of Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Daniel Dennett and Sam 
Harris, its “Four Horsemen”.  
74 He seems to be ready to sacrifice any substantive truth in the benefit of peace. Yet he still 
holds as true the “rules, treatises, procedures” such as the human rights and the rule of law. 
Beck U and Livingstone R. (2010) A God of One's Own: Religion's Capacity for Peace and 
Potential for Violence: John Wiley & Sons. But are concepts like human rights, the rule of law, 
democracy pure formal conventions? Have they not arisen in specific circumstances, and do 
they not possess a substantive content in agreement with a certain world view? There is reason 
why, the concept of human rights for instance has been interpreted and given a substance very 
differently in the Western world, in the Arab world and in China.  
75 See for instance: Taylor C, Gutmann A, Appiah KA, et al. (2011) Multiculturalism: (Expanded 
paperback edition): Princeton University Press. Benedict. (2004) Truth and tolerance : 
Christian belief and world religions, San Francisco: Ignatius Press. Habermas J. (2006) 
Religion in the Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy 14: 1-25. 
76 Beck U and Livingstone R. (2010) A God of One's Own: Religion's Capacity for Peace and 
Potential for Violence: John Wiley & Sons. 
77 Ibid. 
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but alongside the rest of communities and systems of faith?78 Habermas, whom 
Beck would appear to wish outdoing,79 is much clearer and more aware that his 
own position is also a worldview.80  
Beck’s individual cosmopolitanism possesses, according to him, the capacity 
to bring religions from the borders of fundamentalism, irrationality, and violence, 
to a situation in which they renounce to uphold the absolute truth they claimed 
to have, and rather cooperate with the rest in a pragmatic way to attain the goal 
of global peace.81  
Beck’s position should therefore be open to religions as they are and try to 
make them work together from a formal, value-free standpoint. But this is not 
possible for three reasons. First, he restricts his scope to those systems of belief 
that are “problematic” in his view: religions. Not a word about secular systems of 
belief. Second, his own stance is secular and substantive (not neutral). And third, 
he advances a normative perspective on religion (the God of one’s own, which is 
as much an empirical but partial reality in some societies, as it is a suggestion on 
what religion should be in the XXI century).82  
Now that makes Beck’s position at least unstable. If he wants religions to come 
under individual cosmopolitanism to become cooperative and peaceful, Beck 
should clearly recognise, as Habermas does, that his position is substantive and 
secular (located within Taylor’s immanent frame). But that would create in other 
systems of belief, a sense of unfairness (why the system of belief of individual 
cosmopolitanism has to rule over other systems of belief, say over Islam or over 
New Atheism?). Further, if his position regards the “God” talk (“of one’s own in 
this case) as pure figure of speech, then people for whom religion is a serious 
matter, and a reality, would not have much reason to pay him attention.83 Or, if 
 
78 Ibid. Beck recurs to Durkheim to base his cosmopolitanism: “…the only possible candidate is 
precisely this religion of humanity whose rational expression is the individualistic morality.” 
“The idea on which individualisation is based, namely, the belief that the individual is sacred, 
states that man has become a god for man.” “And in the interior of the religion of the godlike 
individual, altars are erected to a God of one’s own.” Accordingly, Becks asserts that “Amnesty 
International may be said to represent a modern church dedicated to a ‘god of its own’”.  
79 See: ibid. 
80 See, for instance: Habermas J. (2010) An Awareness of What is Missing – Faith and Reason 
in a Post-Secular Age, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
81 Beck U and Livingstone R. (2010) A God of One's Own: Religion's Capacity for Peace and 
Potential for Violence: John Wiley & Sons. 
82 He expresses a new dogma that religions ought to follow, the “principle of religious truth,” 
according to which “in religious matters, there is no truth apart from the personal truth that one 
has acquired through one’s own efforts” (ibid.) But how well would this principle impress the 
many religions—Judaism, Islam, and others—that claim that truth (“religious” or not) has been 
revealed by powers beyond any human being? Could Beck’s position arise positive answers from 
religious people, with statements like those? Can religious people feel addressed by a discussion 
that repeatedly speaks of “churches” a foreign concept to non-Christian religions? See, as an 
example: ibid. 
83 And if his intention is to appeal to religious people and to institutionalised religions with 
oficial doctrines, Beck does his cause Little favour by assuming several times throughout the 
book that religious people tend “to denigrate followers of other faiths as unbelievers or heretics 
and to question their human dignity.” Ibid. But that assertion would be at least inaccurate for a 
vast majority of religious people. For starters, “unbelievers” would not necessarily be equivalent 
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he actually is holding a genuine religious view (a real belief in God of some kind), 
he good then would lose attention from atheists and other secular systems of 
belief for whom immanence is all there is in this field (of “God” or “gods”).  
Beck’s stands a very interesting proposal. It is a positive invitation to construct 
a better atmosphere and to amend past mistakes, by bringing people and groups 
from all creeds to the table.84 It seeks to go beyond pure controversy to find 
workable solutions, and that is certainly well located intellectually to address the 
new challenges the world faces in the XXI century.  
Yet as it is hoped has been shown in the precedent sections, concrete problems 
like the ones revealed in Lautsi can be better addressed using a nuanced approach 
such as the combination of Habermas’s, Casanova’s, Taylor’s and Weiler’s 
perspectives.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The need for an inclusive public sphere and for a concept of “neutral neutrality,” 
one in which secularity and secularism are distinguished, is felt not only in 
Europe’s “affluent societies,” but also in other regions of the world. As mentioned 
above, among those considered more secularised (and therefore susceptible of 
undergoing a “post-secular” experience are Canada, New Zealand and Australia.  
Lautsi v Italy showcases a subject that will become increasingly important in 
Europe. Apart from the legal intricacies (for instance the discussion about the 
“margin of appreciation”) on which I do not have space or competence to 
comment, the final decision could signal a positive trend for neutrality in the 
European public sphere. Secularity seems to have earned a place in contemporary 
democracies as the best arrangement of political power and social order so far. 
The model has travelled and been applied successfully in other regions of the 
world (including Australia). Europe should be proud of this achievement, found 
after centuries of strife and division.  
Furthermore, secularity should be the formal and procedural structure 
adopted in face of the challenge of integrating new European residents and 
citizens, many of whom possess diverse cultural backgrounds. Secularity 
promises an arena which is neutral, and at any rate plural and inclusive of all 
members of the political community: those who believe, those who do not, those 
who have not made up their minds, and those who are not interested in the 
discussion. Worldviews, Weltanschauungen, “philosophies of life,” religions, 
normative positions, belief systems, “comprehensive views of the good,” as long 
as they are held by European citizens should all be both, respected and included 
in the public sphere on equal ground.  
 
to “heretics” for many of them, nor would the fact that others had a different system of belief be 
a reason to question their human dignity. That is certainly the case for Christians today, as it is 
for New Atheists.  
84 Ibid. 
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Secularism is a respectable worldview or normative position; and so it should 
be as much for those who profess it, as for those who do not share it. Islam should 
receive equal public dignity and respectability. A religion held by millions of 
people worldwide, it has produced extraordinary cultural developments since the 
VIII century. Its thinkers were genuine intellectual counterparts to the greatest 
European minds of the Middle Ages. It is a religion that brings purpose and 
meaning to millions of European citizens today. There is no reason why Muslims 
should be marginalised from the public sphere.  
Unfortunately (or perhaps, fortunately) violence, stubbornness, closed-
mindedness, intolerance, and rashness of judgement, cannot be pinned down to 
one worldview only. It seems to be a human thing into which people of any 
worldview (religious or not) if not careful, can fall.  The pretence that some 
worldviews are neutral by default is mistaken and damaging. If a strong, cohesive 
and renewed political community is to be constructed in Europe, the public 
sphere has to be plural and inclusive of all worldviews—eminently when those 
worldviews are important for significant sectors of the population. The only way 
to build a liberal democracy is by being truly liberal and democratic.  
If citizens (as is overwhelmingly the case of Muslims in Europe) are willing to 
abide by the laws of the polity, respect the secular structures, participate in 
political life, and engage in deliberation in the public sphere, there is no reason 
why they should be stigmatised, marginalised or diminished in any way just 
because they are religious, or engage in public religious practices or rites, or 
choose in their freedom to wear headscarves. The same respect should be shown 
for Europeans of other religions and worldviews. Only a public sphere which is in 
principle open, plural, inclusive, substantively and normatively neutral, will make 
the task of building mutual recognition, intercultural exchange, equality, 
solidarity, and eventually a common political identity, possible. 
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